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Upholding a 40-Year-Old Promise:
Why the Texas Sonogram Act is
Unlawful According to Planned
Parenthood v. Casey
Vicki Toscano* and Elizabeth Reiter**
I.

Introduction

Since 2003, a woman seeking an abortion in Texas must
undergo one additional medical procedure at least 24 hours
prior to receiving an abortion in order for the woman’s consent
to an abortion to be considered “voluntary and informed” under
the law.1 Although this medical procedure may not be deemed
medically necessary by physicians, the state has declared it
necessary for all women seeking an abortion.2 In the early
stages of pregnancy, this procedure often requires the insertion
of a large probe into the vagina of the pregnant woman, even
against her will.3
* Vicki Toscano is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Nova
Southeastern University. She obtained her J.D. at SUNY at Buffalo School of
Law (1999) and received her Ph.D. in Philosophy at SUNY at Buffalo (2002).
** Elizabeth Reiter, J.D. (SUNY at Buffalo School of Law, 1999) is an
attorney at Guttman & Wallace in Ithaca, New York. She has also worked at
the New York State Appellate Division, Fourth Department and Alston &
Bird, LLP.
1. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013). The law
does contain exceptions to the 24-hour requirement in the event that there is
a medical emergency requiring an immediate abortion or if the pregnant
woman certifies that she lives more than 100 miles away from the nearest
abortion provider. Id. §§ 171.012(4), 171.0124.
2. Id. § 171.011. An abortion can only be performed with the woman’s
voluntary and informed consent. Id.
3. In early pregnancy, transvaginal ultrasounds may be needed to create
a clear image and over 85% of pregnancies are aborted in the first trimester.
See In Brief: Fact Sheet: Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States,
GUTTMACHER
INST.,
1-2
(Dec.
2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html
[hereinafter
Induced Abortion].
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The medical procedure is a sonogram, done for the
purposes of viewing the fetus. Texas is not alone in requiring
sonograms prior to abortion—as of January 2014, at least
seven other states require non-medically necessary sonograms
prior to abortion.4 In addition to the states that require women
to receive sonograms prior to having an abortion, at least nine
other states require that if a sonogram is to be performed as
part of the preparation for abortion, then the pregnant woman
must be offered the opportunity to view the sonogram images.5
Five other states require that women be offered the
opportunity by their provider to have a sonogram before
abortion.6
However, Texas has taken this requirement a step further.
Now, as women may be forcibly probed, they will also have a
screen displaying the sonogram images pointed toward their
face (although they may shut their eyes or turn their heads
away) and the fetal heartbeat, if one can be heard, will be
played for them.7 Meanwhile, state law mandates that the
physician describe the sonogram images to the pregnant
woman, including the dimensions of the fetus, the existence of
cardiac activity, and the existence of external members and
internal organs.8 Three other states have passed sonogram
laws similar to the one in Texas.9
This scenario brings to mind the iconic scene from “A

4. See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER
INST.
1-2
(Jan.
1,
2014),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf
[hereinafter
Requirements for Ultrasound].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal
Pain, Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 347 &
n.59 (2011).
8. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012, 171.0122 (West
2013). Unless they fit into a qualified exception: victims of sexual assault,
minors using the judicial bypass option, or if the fetus has been diagnosed
with a medical condition or abnormality. Id. § 171.0122.
9. Courts have blocked these sonogram regulations from going into effect
in North Carolina (Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011)) and
Oklahoma (Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010)). As of
March 2014, Louisiana’s law was still in effect. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.35.2(C)-(D) (2013).
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Clockwork Orange,” in which a prisoner has his eyes forcibly
pinned open so he may be forced to watch videos that have
been deemed useful in modifying his criminal behavior.10
Although the state of Texas has not mandated that women’s
eyes be pinned open in order to view the sonogram images, the
justification for forcing women to receive a sonogram, be shown
the viewing screen, and be presented with a description thereof
is the same as that given in “A Clockwork Orange”—it is for
the good of the patient.11
The Texas Sonogram Act12 was initially blocked by a
district court, which found that it violated the First
Amendment rights of physicians.13 Nonetheless, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals overruled this decision and
determined that this new requirement does not violate either
the First Amendment rights of physicians or women’s
constitutional rights to reproductive decision-making.14
Although the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a woman’s right
to have an abortion as a fundamental right when it decided Roe
v. Wade15 40 years ago, the Court has decided a number of
cases since that time, which have impacted both the right of
women to obtain an abortion and the ability of states to
regulate abortion. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,16 the Supreme Court upheld certain
state abortion regulations that purported to advance the
informed consent of the pregnant woman.17 Today, it is unclear

10. See generally A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (Warner Bros. 1971).
11. Id.
12. Texas passed an Act “relating to informed consent to abortion,” in
which the main portion of the law requires the performance of a sonogram.
2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 73 (West) (codified as amended at TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.002, 171.012, 171.0121-171.0124, 171.013,
171.015, 241.007, 243.017, 245.006, 245.024 & TEX. OCC. §§ 164.055,
164.0551 (West 2013)). References to the Texas Sonogram Act are to TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013).
13. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 947-48 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir.
2012).
14. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570 (5th Cir. 2012).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
17. Id. at 882-883.
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which regulations states may impose constitutionally on
abortion with the supposed purpose of enhancing women’s
informed consent. The most recent and revealing Supreme
Court case, Gonzales v. Carhart,18 went so far as to allow a
complete ban on one type of abortion procedure, for the
supposed purpose of protecting women’s informed consent.19
Further confusion lies in the claim made in Casey that
state abortion regulations for the purpose of protecting fetal life
may be constitutional even prior to viability.20 That case
presented twin goals of protecting potential life and enhancing
women’s autonomy as co-existent.21 Gonzales v. Carhart,
however, upheld a statute that clearly limits women’s
autonomy by proscribing partial-birth abortion, regardless of
any determinations of the patient and her physician regarding
the patient’s medical needs.22 Although the Court tried to
relate the ban on partial-birth abortion to enhancing the
informed consent of pregnant women seeking an abortion, the
majority opinion identified two purposes of the ban: to send a
message about the value of fetal life and to regulate medical
ethics.23
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Casey and Gonzales have
led to a massive number of new regulations regarding abortion
in recent years.24 Aside from new sonogram requirements,
many states now require disclosures regarding the possibility
of the fetus feeling pain as early as twenty weeks and the
purported associations between abortion and increased risks of
suicide, breast cancer, infertility, and negative emotional
health.25 The link between these regulations and the goals of

18. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
19. Id.
20. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
21. Id. at 833.
22. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 133.
23. Id. at 157.
24. See News in Context: More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted
in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire Previous Decade, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2,
2014),
https://guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/print/2014/01/02/index.html
(noting that North Dakota, Texas, Arkansas, and North Carolina were “key
to th[e] increase” in 2013.
25. See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion:
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protecting potential life and enhancing informed consent are
unclear. Many of these claims are scientifically dubious,26 and
it is unlikely that any of them will significantly affect a
woman’s choice to abort, as this is driven by many nonnegotiable and powerful factors.27
The Supreme Court has yet to review this new generation
of regulations on abortion, but such review is both timely and
necessary. The extent to which these regulations have invaded
women’s bodily integrity, have violated women’s dignity, and
have moved from persuasion to manipulation in an attempt to
protect potential life is unprecedented. It is necessary that we
return to the constitutional “undue burden” test adopted in
Casey28 in order to reassess what limitations that opinion is
best understood as creating with regard to these state
Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
111, 140-51 (2008); Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How
Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 13-26 (2012). See also Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash,
State Abortion Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of
Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 6-13 (2007).
26. See, e.g., Hani K. Atrash & Carol J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect of
Pregnancy Termination on Future Reproduction, 4 BALLIERE’S CLINICAL
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 391, 391-92 (1990); Gold & Nash, supra note 25,
at 6-13 (determining that, of the 23 states studied that mandate information
be provided to women seeking abortions, many mandate the provision of
information that not only violates the tenets of informed consent, but is
scientifically inaccurate); Katherine DeLellis Henderson et al., Incomplete
Pregnancy is not Associated with Breast Cancer Risk: The California Teachers
Study, 77 CONTRACEPTION 391 (2008) (study concludes that there is “no
relationship between incomplete pregnancy and breast cancer risk.”); Trine
Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental
Disorder, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332, 332 (2011) (finding no association
between abortion and likelihood of contact with psychiatric services for
mental disorder); Tobin, supra note 25, at 143-48 (regarding claims of fetal
pain during early stages of pregnancy).
27. See Induced Abortion, supra note 3 (“The reasons women give for
having an abortion underscore their understanding of the responsibilities of
parenthood and family life. Three-fourths of women cite concern for or
responsibility to other individuals; three-fourths say they cannot afford a
child; three-fourths say that having a baby would interfere with work, school
or the ability to care for dependents; and half say they do not want to be a
single parent or are having problems with their husband or partner.”)
(footnote omitted). Additionally commentators have noted that women
historically have been willing to face high levels of medical risk to obtain
abortions. See Tobin, supra note 25, at 125.
28. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992).
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regulations on abortion. Through the years many theorists and
Courts have attempted to interpret the undue burden test in
Casey.29 Many of these interpretations have overlooked the
requirement that women’s decision-making processes must be
free from manipulation and coercion, and thus have
misunderstood the balance struck in Casey. To truly advance
the twin goals being discussed in Casey—protection of potential
life and enhancing women’s informed consent—courts must
recognize that state abortion regulations that interfere with a
woman’s decision-making liberty in an attempt to protect
potential life impose an undue burden on a women’s right to
choose an abortion.
Additionally, some theorists have recently attempted to
apply the standards created in Casey to the Texas Sonogram
Act, or laws like it, to determine whether such laws are
constitutional.30 In so doing, however, parts of their analyses
were limited by a rather restrictive understanding of what is
rightfully said to create an undue burden and what is rightfully
said to be misleading information. By applying a different

29. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion
Rights after Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 682-89 (2004);
Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 223, 242-63 (2009); Jeffrey
A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative DueProcess Anti-Discrimination Principle That Gives Constitutional Content to
the “Undue Burden” Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control
Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 211, 243 (2001); Linda J.
Wharton, et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 323-385 (2006)
(discussing various cases); Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1980 1985-91 (2002); Gillian E.
Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025 (1994); Kaitlyn
Moredock, Note, “Ensuring so Grave a Choice is Well Informed”: The Use of
Abortion Informed Consent Laws to Promote State Interests in Unborn Life,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1973 (2010).
30. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 349-57 (2011); Tobin, supra note 25,
at 140-51; Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 13-33; Robert M. Godzeno, Note,
The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed Consent Legislation PostGonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 285, 303-21 (2009); Jeffrey
Roseberry, Undue Burden and the Law of Abortion in Arizona, 44 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 391, 397-418 (2012); Sarah E. Weber, Comment, An Attempt to Legislate
Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion
Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 364-81 (2009).
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interpretation of the undue burden standard in Casey, one that
best represents the balance that the Supreme Court created in
Casey, we conclude that the Texas Sonogram Act and all other
laws like it constitute an unconstitutional infringement on
women’s due process rights with respect to abortion.31
This Article begins with a brief review in Part II of the
three crucial Supreme Court cases on abortion rights: Roe v.
Wade,32 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,33 and Gonzalez v. Carhart.34 Based on these cases, Part
III formulates a constitutional test that courts should be using
to determine whether an abortion regulation is constitutional
that includes all of the factors identified by the Supreme Court
as part of the “undue burden” analysis, factors that have been
overlooked by many courts. Finally, Part IV applies this
constitutional test to the Texas Sonogram Act, concluding that
the act is unconstitutional because it: (1) requires the delivery
of misleading, untruthful and irrelevant information; (2)
unconstitutionally hinders women’s decision-making liberty;
and (3) poses a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of the
relevant group of women affected by the regulation.
II. The Evolution of Abortion Law
In order to analyze the legal implications of the Texas
Sonogram Act, we must first understand three benchmark U.S.
Supreme Court cases that establish the current legal landscape
regarding state abortion regulations: Roe v. Wade,35 Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,36 and

31. This is not to suggest that there are not also other independent
constitutional grounds that may support finding these forced sonogram laws
unconstitutional. Physicians’ first amendment rights, for example, are also
obviously implicated. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 939, 959 (2007); Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and
Say ‘Ideology’: Physicians and the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
155, 155 (2009).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Gonzales v. Carhart.37 Taken together, these cases explain why
a requirement that forces a woman to undergo a sonogram,
potentially transvaginal, and to listen to a medical description
of the fetus with no medical necessity could appear to be legally
justified despite its unconstitutional intrusion upon a woman’s
right to privacy.
A. Roe v. Wade38
Decided in 1973, the Roe decision is based upon the notion
of an individual’s fundamental right to privacy with regard to
reproductive decisions.39 In Roe, the Court found that “[t]his
right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”40 The
Court also based a woman’s right to abortion, in part, upon the
autonomy of medical professionals, stating:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician
to administer medical treatment according to his
professional judgment up to the points where
important state interests provide compelling
justifications for intervention. Up to those points,
the abortion decision in all its aspects is
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision,
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
physician.41
Although the Court found that women have a fundamental
right to have an abortion, at least prior to viability of the fetus,

37. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. 410 U.S. at 154. The Supreme Court had explicated the privacy right
regarding reproductive decisions. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
40. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
41. Id. at 165-66. Described by some scholars as a “medical model of
abortion,” this model has been present since the first right-to-life movement
began in 1850. B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 507 (2009); see generally KRISTIN LUKER,
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
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this right was grounded in women’s relationships with their
physicians. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Roe found that
this right to privacy was not absolute.42 The Court determined
that during the first trimester of pregnancy, there were no
state interests sufficiently strong to override a woman’s right to
abort and thus, no state regulations would be constitutional at
that time.43 During the second trimester, only the state’s
interest in regulating abortion for the protection of the
woman’s health would be allowed.44 Finally, during the third
trimester, the state’s interest in potential life is sufficiently
strong to justify the complete prohibition of abortion except
where it is necessary to protect the life or the health of the
pregnant woman.45 The relevance of the third trimester was its
association with the notion of fetal viability—the point in time
when the fetus could, theoretically, survive on its own outside
the womb.46 The Court seemed to indicate that if the point of
viability were pushed forward in time due to scientific
advances, then the state’s interest in potential life would also
be pushed forward along with it.47 Thus, the Court in Roe
created a legal framework that balanced the fundamental right
of privacy afforded to pregnant women against the state’s
interest in potential life.48 Ultimately, however, the Court in
Roe gave women the right to make their own decisions
regarding abortion prior to viability.49 As we shall see, this
crucial promise made in Roe was not intended to be disturbed
by the decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.50

42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
43. Id. at 162-64.
44. Id. at 163-65.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 160, 163.
47. Id. at 163-65.
48. Id. at 159.
49. Id. at 163.
50. See 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (“The woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a
rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.”).
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B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey51
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
is an important turning point in the development of abortion
law because, although it did not alter the Roe determination
that women are the ultimate decision-makers regarding
abortion pre-viability, it did significantly alter the framework
used to determine the constitutionality of abortion
regulations.52
Turning to the substance of the decision, the justices who
co-authored the plurality opinion recognized that, in addition to
protecting the health of the pregnant woman, states have a
legitimate interest in protecting the life of the fetus from the
point of conception.53 Prior to viability, the states’ interest in
protecting the life of the fetus is not strong enough either to
allow a total ban on abortion or to create regulations that
impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose
abortion.54 The Court explained that an undue burden is
“shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”55 Thus,
“[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound
respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to
choose.”56 After a fetus reaches viability, however, states are
free to prohibit abortion unless the abortion is necessary to
protect the life or health of the mother, in accordance with
Roe.57
But at what point does a regulation present a substantial

51. Id. at 833.
52. Id. at 871-72.
53. Id. at 869.
54. Id. at 878-79.
55. Id. at 877.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 879 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65). See Wharton, et al., supra
note 29, at 330-31.
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obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion?58 In applying the new
“undue burden” standard, the Casey Court upheld a regulation
requiring that: (a) at least 24 hours before performing an
abortion, the physician inform the pregnant woman of the
nature of the procedure, the health risks of both the abortion
and of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the
unborn child” (except in a medical emergency), and (b) the
pregnant woman give her written consent to the procedure.59
Prior to Casey, this type of law requiring specific counseling
information and a 24-hour waiting period had been struck
down by the Court.60 In Casey, however, the Court recognized
that a state may “further its legitimate goal of protecting the
life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a
decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing
the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”61
For the first time, the Supreme Court recognized a state right
to create mechanisms designed to impact the decision-making
processes of women choosing abortion.
Determining what precedent Casey set here poses a
challenge, however, even for legal scholars, because of the
nature of the plurality decision.62 Three justices (O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter) co-authored the Casey opinion, and
certain sections of that opinion were joined in by two additional
justices (Stevens and Blackmun), and are therefore legally
binding.63 Both Stevens and Blackmun dissented from the
portion of the decision establishing the undue burden standard
and both rejected the claim that the regulations did anything to
advance informed consent.64 The precedential value of these
58. See infra Parts III and IV for analysis regarding the meaning of a
“substantial obstacle” and its application to the Texas Sonogram Act.
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
60. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists 476
U.S. 747, 759-60 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc.
(Akron I), 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983).
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
62. Since Casey was decided, however, a majority of the Supreme Court
used this standard. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
U.S. 968, 971 (1997).
63. Casey, 505 U.S. 843, 922 (1992)
64. Id. at 914-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 922-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sections is ambiguous at best, a fact that many seem to have
ignored as abortion law has evolved during the 15 years since
Casey.65
Since the decision in Casey, the constitutional protection
afforded the right to choose abortion is not as clear as it once
was under Roe. Under Roe, abortion was protected as a
fundamental privacy right afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.66 The constitutional analysis
in Roe regarding the fundamental right of privacy with respect
to abortion dovetailed with other decisions involving the
protection of fundamental rights in general.67 Specifically,
states may not infringe upon a fundamental right in the
absence of a compelling government interest, and, even then,
states must use the least restrictive means to achieve such
interest (the strict scrutiny test).68 In Roe, the court found that
the protection of potential life is not a compelling government
interest until the point of viability and, thus, it would follow
that any regulation of abortion for the sole purpose of
protecting potential life prior to viability would be
unconstitutional.69 Although states could enact regulations
protecting the fetus post-viability, that right would be
subordinate to a woman’s right to protect her own life and
health where the two rights conflict.70
Following Casey, however, abortion regulations that take
65. Lower courts appear to be adopting this as the new constitutional
test for abortion regulations. See, e.g., Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v.
Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 367-74 (6th Cir. 2006); A Woman's Choice-East Side
Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 690-93 (7th Cir. 2002); Fargo
Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 530-36 (8th Cir. 1994);
Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 452-461 (W.D. Ky. 2000). Also, one
recent Note has even claimed that Casey created “a binding standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of abortion informed consent statutes” even
though only three justices actually supported that standard in the case.
Moredock, supra note 29, at 1987.
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
67. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc. (Akron I), 462
U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48485 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
69. See supra Part II.A.
70. Id.
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effect prior to the viability of the fetus are no longer subject to
strict scrutiny.71 Instead, regulations that serve a permissible
government interest may be upheld so long as they do not pose
an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to choose abortion.72
Thus, although Casey clearly still meant to afford women the
right to choose abortion prior to viability, determining exactly
what this new undue burden standard means from a
constitutional perspective is extremely difficult given the fact
that only three of nine Supreme Court justices created an
entirely new framework of constitutional analysis.73
Of further interest, five of the justices joined in a
discussion in Casey that suggests a significantly different
constitutional grounding for the right to abortion compared to
Roe. The Court said:
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow
that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all
instances. That is because the liberty of the
woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The
mother who carries a child to full term is subject
to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that
only she must bear. That these sacrifices have
from the beginning of the human race been
endured by woman with a pride that ennobles
her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a
bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the
State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision
of the woman’s role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and
our culture. The destiny of the woman must be
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in

71. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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society.74
The language suggests something that feminists have long
supported regarding abortion: that abortion is not just about
“privacy” as Roe had maintained, but that without the right to
choose abortion, women do not have rights to equal
citizenship.75 The notion in Roe that abortion should be seen
merely as another medical decision made between patient and
doctor appears to be giving way to a view of abortion as central
to women’s liberty and equality. On the face of it, this would
appear to be an important victory for those who argue for
reproductive rights.76 But, while Casey reframed a woman’s
decision to terminate a pregnancy in a way that no longer
views doctors as primary actors in the abortion decision, many
states have used this as a way to further burden both the
abortion decision and those doctors who remain willing to
perform abortions.77 This consequence of Casey becomes much
more apparent when examined in light of Gonzales v.
Carhart,78 discussed below.
C. Gonzales v. Carhart79
Gonzales v. Carhart addresses the constitutionality of the
74. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
75. See e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality
Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991,
994, 1011 & n.92 (2007).
76. Some commentators have suggested that the Court may have
intentionally used such strong language in recognition of the ultimate
weakening that they were about to do with regard to constitutional protection
of the abortion right. See Borgmann, supra note 29, at 679. But see Reva
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696-97 (2008) (arguing that the strong
language reflects the majority’s concern with a multi-dimensional aspect of
dignity, including the dignity of protecting life of the unborn, liberty, and the
equality of women) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection].
77. See Wharton, et al., supra note 29, at 319-21. During the time
between 1985 and 1991, states enacted sixty-eight laws restricting abortion,
while from 1992 to 2005 states enacted 299 laws restricting abortion. See id.
at 319 n.8 (citing Memorandum from Elizabeth Nash, Pub. Policy Assoc. Alan
Guttmacher Inst. (Apr. 26, 2006) (on file with authors)).
78. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
79. Id.
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Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, a federal law banning the
use of intact D&E (dilation and evacuation) or intact D&X
(dilation and extraction), popularly known as “partial-birth
abortion.”80 A brief discussion of various types of abortion
procedures will be helpful to understand the issues addressed
in Gonzales. Between 85-90% of abortions occur in the first
trimester and utilize either vacuum aspiration, wherein the
contents of the uterus are removed via suction, or medical
abortion, which consists of a pill often taken at home.81 In the
large majority of second and third trimester abortions, doctors
perform a procedure known as D&E (herein called “standard
D&E”), which requires the physician to dilate the cervix and
then insert surgical instruments through the cervix to evacuate
the fetus.82 This requires several passes, as the fetal remains
are removed in stages.83 Intact D&E or D&X, the procedure at
issue here, differs from standard D&E in that the physician
evacuates the fetus from the uterus with only one pass.84
Because intact D&E ensures complete evacuation of the fetus,
it reduces the likelihood of medical complications that are
present in a standard D&E.85 This is due to the failure to fully
evacuate the fetus despite several passes, the higher risk of
perforation or damage to the pregnant woman’s body due to
multiple insertions of surgical instruments, and the potential
exposure of the pregnant woman to sharp bony fragments.86 An
oft-cited study of the incidence of so-called partial-term
abortion conducted prior to the passage of the Partial-Birth

80. Id. at 132, 136-37; 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012).
81. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence &
Services In the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 6, 12-13 (2003); David K. Turok et al., Second Trimester Termination
of Pregnancy: A Review by Site and Procedure Type, 77 CONTRACEPTION 155,
155 (2008).
82. See Phillip G. Stubblefield et al., Methods for Induced Abortion, 104
AM. C. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS 174, 179 (2004); see also Stephen T.
Chasen et al., Dilation and Evacuation at  20 weeks: Comparison of
Operative Techniques, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1180, 1180
(2004).
83. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 925-26 (2000).
84. See id. at 927-28 (2000) (describing such procedures); see also
Stubblefield et al., supra note 82, at 179.
85. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161-62 (2007).
86. Id at 177-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Abortion Act estimated that intact D&E was quite rare,
accounting for only 0.03%-0.05% of all abortions that occurred
in the United States in 1996.87
Specifically, the Partial-Birth Abortion Act bans any doctor
from knowingly performing a “partial-birth” abortion unless it
is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.88 “Partialbirth” abortion was described as occurring when the person
performing the abortion:
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers
a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first
presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the
body of the mother, or, in the case of breech
presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the
navel is outside the body of the mother, for the
purpose of performing an overt act that the
person knows will kill the partially delivered
living fetus; and performs the overt act, other
than completion of delivery, that kills the
partially delivered living fetus.89
Interestingly, a very similar law passed in Nebraska was
found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2000 in
Stenberg v. Carhart.90 One main difference between the
Nebraska law and the Partial-Birth Abortion Act, according to
the Gonzales Court, is that the description of “partial-birth”
abortion in the federal law was more precise and could not be
interpreted to include standard D&E procedures.91 The Court
believed this allowed physicians more precise notice regarding
banned procedures and left the practice of standard D&E

87. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the
United States, 1995-1996, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 263, 287 (1998), available at
http://sparky.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3026398.html (last visited Jan. 7,
2014).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012).
89. See id. § 1531(b)(1)(A)–(B).
90. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000).
91. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 148-50 (majority opinion); cf. Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 941-46.
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undisturbed.92 Nonetheless, many doctors disagreed with this
conclusion by the Court.93
The statute also included a provision which allowed a
doctor who performed such an abortion to mount a legal
defense based on the claim that, “the physician’s conduct was
necessary to save the life of the mother whose life was
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical
injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused
by or arising from the pregnancy itself.”94 The availability of a
legal defense is markedly different from an outright exception
from the ban in cases where the mother’s life is in danger. It is
crucial to note that, since Roe, all post-viability abortions may
be banned so long as there is an exception allowing for an
abortion necessary to protect the life or the health of the
pregnant woman (a “health exception”).95 Here, although the
ban on post-viability intact D&E on its face seems
constitutional since the government is free to ban all abortions
post-viability in general, the fact that this statute does not
contain a health exception places it out of touch with the
requirements in Roe and Casey. In fact, this was one of the
main reasons why the Nebraska statute was found to be
unconstitutional in the 2000 case.96 The other important thing
to note here is that this ban is actually being imposed not only
on post-viability abortions but on pre-viability abortions as
well.97 Thus, to be found constitutional following Casey, the
Court also had to determine whether this ban created an undue
burden for women seeking a second term pre-viability abortion.
In a five-to-four opinion, the Supreme Court upheld this
act as constitutional.98 Most importantly for our purposes, the
Court found that this Act does not pose an undue burden on a
woman’s right to abortion, even with the lack of a health

92. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 151-56.
93. See Michael F. Greene, The Intimidation of American Physicians –
Banning Partial-Birth Abortion, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2128, 2128 (2007).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(d)(1).
95. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937-38; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
96. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937-38.
97. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
98. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
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exception.99 To begin its analysis of this statute, the majority
opinion claimed that Casey supported the proposition, among
other things, “that the government has a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.”100
The majority declared that, “we must determine whether the
Act furthers the legitimate interest of the Government in
protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child.”101
Thus, the majority starts their constitutional analysis of this
statute by assuming that a regulation on abortion, which
applies even pre-viability, may still be found constitutional if
its sole purpose is simply to protect the life of the fetus.102 Of
course, the regulation still cannot have the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of the pregnant
woman seeking an abortion.103 The Court said:
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does
not impose an undue burden, the State may use
its regulatory power to bar certain procedures
and substitute others, all in furtherance of its
legitimate interests in regulating the medical
profession in order to promote respect for life,
including life of the unborn.104
Further, the majority found that the statute in question
did in fact further its purported purposes.105 The Court
recognized that even standard D&E could be seen as devaluing
life, but that by banning the intact D&E procedure, Congress
had “additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a
special prohibition.”106 The Court argued that this procedure’s
similarity to infanticide raised the need to create a bright line
between the two acts, which this ban accomplished.107 In
99. Id. at 164-68.
100. Id. at 145.
101. Id. at 146.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 158.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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addition, the Court argued that the statute recognizes the
reality that, “[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.”108
The Court then explained that abortion may lead to negative
psychological consequences for many women.109 From this, the
Court declared that due to the emotionally charged situation
involving abortion, some doctors may not provide precise
details regarding the abortion procedure that they plan to
perform.110 The Court concluded that this lack of detail
regarding the manner in which the fetus will be “killed” is a
legitimate state concern for two reasons: (1) to preserve and
protect the mental and emotional health of the mother, who
may suffer even more intense emotional pain and suffering and
ultimately regret the decision that she made to abort the fetus
after she comes to find out about the manner in which the fetus
was killed, and (2) to preserve fetal life because of the
“reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation .
. . will be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full
term.”111 Thus, the Court concluded that the purpose of the ban
was not to create a substantial obstacle in the path of the
woman seeking an abortion, but instead to achieve the
legitimate purpose of protecting and preserving maternal
health and fetal life.112
The majority recognized, however, that this was not the
end of the inquiry and also examined whether the statute has
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of the
woman seeking an abortion.113 Specifically, the Court spent
some time discussing whether the lack of a health exception
108. Id. at 159.
109. Id. (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to
abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and
loss of esteem can follow.”) (citations omitted).
110. Id. (noting, however, that this is a common occurrence with many
types of surgical procedures).
111. Id. at 159-60. Although the reason for this is not stated directly by
the Court, the majority seems to be suggesting that this ban serves as a way
to educate people regarding late term abortion in general, and is done in a
way that will encourage women to choose against such abortions once they
learn about the ban.
112. Id.
113. Id.at 158-61.
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created an undue burden.114 Here, the Court acknowledged
that if this ban of a particular abortion procedure did create
significant health risks for women seeking abortions then the
lack of a health exception would, in fact, pose an undue
burden.115 The Court concluded, however, that since medical
experts disagreed as to whether the ban of partial-birth
abortion would give rise to significant health risks for women,
this uncertainty in and of itself could justify the Court’s
determination that the Act did not impose an undue burden.116
The dissent written by Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued
directly against a number of the arguments made by the
majority and argued that the majority’s reasoning distorted the
Court’s holdings in Casey.117 Many commentators agree with
Ginsburg that the majority incorrectly applied the law to these
issues.118 Ginsburg’s dissent takes aim at the majority’s claim
that this law may stand even without a health exception.119
Ginsburg argued that “a State must avoid subjecting women to
health risks not only where the pregnancy itself creates
danger, but also where state regulation forces women to resort
to less safe methods of abortion.”120 Where a division of medical
opinion exists regarding the necessity of a certain abortion
procedure, the division itself should be understood to signal
risk and the State must err on the side of safeguarding
women’s health.121 Ultimately, she argued that the majority

114. Id. at 161-67.
115. Id. at 161.
116. Id. at 163-64.
117. See generally id. at 169-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind:
Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1601-02
(2008); Manian, supra note 29, at 234, 262-63; Martha K. Plante, “Protecting”
Women’s Health: How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and
Women’s Equal Right to Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 389, 405-09 (2007); Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
Protection, supra note 76, at 1734-35, 1779-80; Ronald Turner, Gonzales v.
Carhart and the Court’s “Women’s Regret” Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1, 18-21 (2008); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., Ginsburg's Dissent May
Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A31, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/20/opinion/oe-sunstein20.
119. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 170-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 172.
121. Id. at 173-74
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has carved out an unprecedented exception to the longstanding requirement that all abortion regulations must first
and foremost safeguard women’s health.122
Ginsburg also addressed the majority’s claim that the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act somehow furthers a legitimate
government purpose.123 In response to the majority’s claim that
this statute furthers the legitimate purpose of protecting fetal
life, she pointed out that the statute does not save even one
fetal life from destruction since other abortion methods remain
available even if the ban persists.124 Additionally, the ban is
obviously not designed for the purpose of protecting women’s
health either.125 She said,
the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for
which it concededly has no reliable evidence:
Women who have abortions come to regret their
choices, and consequently suffer from [s]evere
depression and loss of esteem. Because of
women’s fragile emotional state . . . the Court
deprives women of the right to make an
autonomous choice, even at the expense of their
safety.126
In a full-page footnote she examined the weight of the scientific
evidence that suggests that abortion is no more dangerous to
women’s mental health than is bearing an unwanted child.127
She then argued that this idea cannot even be seen as a
legitimate purpose of a statute as it rests on “ancient notions
about women’s place in the family and under the
Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”128
Gonzales is a Supreme Court case and therefore does have
bearing regarding how to analyze abortion regulations from a

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 179.
Id. at 181-86
Id. at 181.
See id. at 177-80.
Id. at 183-84 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 183 n.7.
Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
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constitutional perspective.129 However, it should be noted that
Gonzales merely purported to apply Casey and not to change
the nature of the undue burden test. The important question
for our purposes then is: what insight does Gonzales add to
Casey’s analysis? There are really two important aspects of this
case to note for our discussion. First, Gonzales suggests that
after Casey, states need only have a legitimate government
interest to regulate abortion so long as the regulation does not
impose an undue burden.130 Second, Gonzales seems to accept
that women’s regret and other emotional problems after
receiving an abortion are problems that may legitimately
motivate a state regulation on abortion.131 These two claims
will be further discussed in Part III and Part IV respectively.
III. Understanding Casey’s Test
Many theorists have argued that the undue burden
standard and the way it is to be applied as explained in Casey
is unclear, malleable, and even potentially contradictory.132
Others have argued that Casey only outlaws abortion
regulations that act as a complete bar to women’s ability to
receive an abortion, or, at least, actively prevent a large
fraction of women affected by the regulation from being able to
receive an abortion.133 Another misconception regarding Casey
is that an undue burden is coextensive with a finding that a
regulation is requiring information that is untruthful,
129. See generally id. at 132 (majority opinion).
130. Id. at 146, 150.
131. Id. at 159.
132. See e.g. Borgmann, supra note 29, at 681 (“Casey’s standard lacks
content, which makes it both difficult to apply and susceptible to
manipulation.”); C. Elaine Howard, The Roe’d to Confusion: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1457, 1458-59 (1993). It is interesting
to note that the Justices joining in the Casey joint opinion noted that the
Court and individual members thereof had inconsistently applied the undue
burden standard in prior decisions. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). The joint opinion then goes on to attempt to
clarify what is meant by the “undue burden” standard as applied to abortion
regulations. See id. at 876-79.
133. See Whitman, supra note 29, at 1985-91; Metzger, supra note 29, at
2030-38; James M. Oleske, Jr., Note, Undue Burdens and the Free Exercise of
Religion: Reworking a “Jurisprudence of Doubt,” 85 GEO. L.J. 751, 768 (1997).
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misleading, or irrelevant.134
Ultimately, very few theorists examining Casey have fully
appreciated the level of protection it affords to women’s
decision-making liberty.135 The only reasonable way to read
Casey is to understand it as safeguarding a woman’s decisionmaking process as strongly as it protects women’s ability to
effectuate their decisions regarding abortion. This aspect of
Casey seems to be universally undervalued, and yet it is this
aspect of Casey that most definitively shows why Texas’s
sonogram law is unconstitutional.
The most concrete “test” created in Casey, as we saw
above, is the requirement that all state regulations on abortion
enacted prior to viability cannot pose an undue burden.136 This
was defined as a regulation that has “the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”137 From this statement, it
seems clear that any state regulation on abortion must be
examined to see whether its purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a pregnant woman. This
“test” raises many important questions when trying to
determine whether a state regulation of abortion prior to
viability is constitutional.
A. Standard of Review
In order to best understand the undue burden test in
Casey, it helps to examine prior development of that standard.
The Supreme Court first applied the undue burden standard to
abortion law in 1983.138 In Akron I, Justice O’Connor addressed
the concept of an undue burden in the dissent, defining as
undue any regulations that act as “absolute obstacles or severe

134. See Moredock, supra note 29, at 1976.
135. But see Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection supra note 76,
at 1753 (“[U]nder the undue burden framework, dignity-respecting regulation
of women’s decisions can neither manipulate nor coerce women . . . .”).
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846
137. Id. at 877.
138. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc. (Akron I),
462 U.S. 416, 463-66 (1983) (O’Connor J., dissenting).
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limitations on the abortion decision.”139 She suggested that if a
state abortion regulation does not create an undue burden,
then it is not unconstitutional.140 If such a regulation created
an undue burden, however, it could nevertheless be upheld as
constitutional if the state was able to show that the regulation
serves a compelling government interest.141
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this Akron I
articulation of the undue burden standard142 by holding that
any abortion regulation creating an undue burden is
unconstitutional without the need for further examination.143
Indeed, the state cannot rehabilitate an unconstitutional
abortion regulation by demonstrating that it serves a
compelling government interest. One issue not fully explicated
by Casey, however, is what type of government interest must a
state have to pass any abortion regulation, regardless of
whether the regulation poses an undue burden.144 Can a state
interfere with a woman’s right to privacy based solely upon the
fact that it has a legitimate government purpose to which the
law is rationally related? Or, must states show something more
to justify the intrusion upon a fundamental right?
Some, including the majority in Gonzales, have interpreted
Casey to stand for the proposition that any abortion regulation
that is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose is
permissible so long as such regulation does not pose an undue
burden.145 To understand Casey this way is to understand it as
offering the least amount of constitutional protection, since this
139. Id. at 464.
140. Id. at 461-63.
141. See id. at 472-74 (regarding the 24-hour waiting period
requirement).
142. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (“To the extent that the opinions of the
Court or of individual Justices use the undue burden standard in a manner
that is inconsistent with this analysis, we set out what in our view should be
the controlling standard.”) (citations omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 877-79
145. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (“Where it has
a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State
may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute others,
all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical
profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn”);
see also Tobin, supra note 25, at 125-27; Metzger, supra note 29, at 2032-33.
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would mean that a state only needs the same basic purpose to
pass an abortion regulation as it would need to pass any other
regulation that does not touch on a constitutionally protected
right. Of course, reading Casey this way does not undo the
requirement that the regulation cannot pose an undue burden,
but it does allow for a requirement easily met regarding what
purpose the state regulation must serve. Although we disagree
with the framing of the test created in Casey this way, as it
gives short shrift to a woman’s fundamental right to liberty in
choosing abortion, we accept this as the correct test for the
purpose of this Article. If we can show that the Texas
Sonogram Law cannot even pass this easiest of constitutional
burdens in terms of the permissible purposes of the law, then
we have certainly shown it would fail if Casey is understood to
require more than this.
B. When is a Burden “Undue”?
In Casey, an undue burden was defined as, “a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.”146 This represents a significant change from
Justice O’Connor’s language in Akron I of, “absolute obstacles
or severe limitations on the abortion decision.”147 This changed
language demonstrates the error of those who interpreted
Casey to mean that an undue burden exists only when a
regulation actually bars women from obtaining abortions. The
burden clearly does not have to pose an absolute bar against
abortion to be undue. Indeed, the Casey Court’s use of the
language “substantial obstacle,”148 as opposed to “severe
limitations,”149 certainly contemplates that a burden that does
not serve as a full bar against abortion may nevertheless be
“undue.”
Additionally, there is an even stronger argument that
shows why the interpretation of “undue burden” as requiring

146. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
147. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc. (Akron I), 462
U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
149. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 464.
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an absolute prohibition on certain women’s ability to get an
abortion is setting the bar too high for a finding of an undue
burden. The Court itself declared that certain kinds of
information are unconstitutional based on the way that
information interferes with women’s decision-making
process.150 This is true regardless of whether this information
actually prevents women from having or choosing abortions. To
see this more clearly, we must examine what Casey said
regarding specific information that may be required for
informed consent statutes regulating abortion.
Advancing the informed consent of women deciding on
abortion is clearly a permissible purpose for state regulations
on abortion after Casey. The Court stated, “[t]hough the woman
has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy
before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is
prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is
thoughtful and informed.”151 In further explaining this
statement, the Court added that certain pieces of information
unrelated to medical risks or other medical aspects of abortion
may be included as part of the state regulation of information
prior to obtaining an abortion.152
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the
State may enact rules and regulations designed
to encourage [the pregnant woman seeking an
abortion] to know that there are philosophic and
social arguments of great weight that can be
brought to bear in favor of continuing the
pregnancy to full term and that there are
procedures and institutions to allow adoption of
unwanted children as well as a certain degree of
state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the
child herself. . . . It follows that States are free to
150. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, 881-85.
151. Id. at 872.
152. Id. at 882-83. The AMA recognizes, generally, the risks and benefits
of treatment. See Sarah Runels, Informed Consent Laws and the Constitution:
Balancing State Interests with a Physician's First Amendment Rights and a
Woman's Due Process Rights, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 185, 186
(2009).
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enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for
a woman to make a decision that has such
profound and lasting meaning.153
Casey also held that the government’s interest in protecting
potential life is a permissible purpose for which states may
create regulations under certain circumstances.154 However,
where state regulations require women to receive certain
information prior to an abortion, those regulations cannot
hinder her choice.155 Indeed, “the means chosen by the State to
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”156 Nonetheless,
the joint opinion even went so far as to say that a regulation
designed to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over
abortion may be permissible.157 In order to promote its interest
in potential life, “the State may take measures to ensure that
the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to
advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion.”158
In keeping with their claim that regulations cannot hinder
a woman’s free choice, the joint opinion determined that not all
information designed to persuade women to choose childbirth
may be included as part of a valid state regulation of
abortion.159 The Court stated that, “[i]f the information the
State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful
and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”160
The Justices also suggested that the information must be
relevant to the decision being made by concluding that,
“informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that
all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73.
Id. at 875-78.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 882-83.
Id. at 882.
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irrelevant.”161 Thus, states may constitutionally require
abortion providers to inform pregnant women of more than just
the normal medical risks of abortion, provided that such
information is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant.162
It is in looking at the way the Court spoke of these dual
purposes—the protection of potential life and of women’s right
to informed consent—that we see what so many people have
missed when examining Casey. Information that a state
mandates to be provided to a pregnant woman seeking an
abortion may constitute an undue burden not only if it
substantially interferes with a woman’s ability to effectuate her
choice to have an abortion, but also if it interferes in a
substantial way with the decision-making process itself. The
Court’s own language bears repeating: “the means chosen by
the State to further the interest in potential life must be
calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”163
First, states may affect a woman’s decision-making process
by providing persuasive information meant to influence a
woman’s ultimate decision whether to terminate a pregnancy
without violating her rights.164 However, if a state interferes
with a woman’s decision-making process by providing her with
false, misleading, or irrelevant information, it imposes an
undue burden upon her decision-making ability and is, thus,
unconstitutional.165
Second, Casey shows that interference with a woman’s
decision-making process may be unconstitutional even if it does
not fully impede her ability to choose.166 By barring absolutely
information that is untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant, the
Court suggested that information that does not ultimately
affect a woman’s choice could nevertheless constitute an undue
burden.167 A woman does not, for example, have to prove that
misleading information directly affected her decision. Rather,
the very fact that the information is misleading renders it
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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Id. at 883.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
Id. at 878.
Id. at 878, 882.
Id. at 882-84.
Id. at 882.
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impermissible. Thus, untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant
information is a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to
make a reasoned and well-informed decision—simply put, it
hinders her free choice.
The above standard cannot be understood as applying only
to information that is untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant in a
narrow sense. This same result applies to any information
required by states that unduly interferes with a woman’s
decision-making process and hinders her free choice. As
discussed in Part IV, this understanding of Casey’s holding is
consistent with a general understanding of informed consent.168
Further, the conclusion that Casey’s undue burden standard
must be understood as placing an absolute ban on information
that is untruthful, misleading, irrelevant or otherwise hinders
a woman’s free choice is supported by both Blackmun’s
concurrence and issues raised in Scalia’s dissent.
First, Blackmun’s concurrence recognized that the joint
opinion must be read as a general prohibition on states’
attempts to unduly interfere with women’s decisions. As he
said, “[b]ecause the State’s information must be ‘calculated to
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it,’ the measures
must be designed to ensure that a woman’s choice is ‘mature
and informed,’ not intimidated, imposed, or impelled.”169 He
went on to argue that this would outlaw not only untruthful,
misleading, or irrelevant information, but also the State must
be careful of the manner of presentation it uses and cannot
pick a mode “in order to inflict ‘psychological abuse,’ designed
to shock or unnerve a woman seeking to exercise her liberty
right.”170 This would prohibit the showing of “graphic literature
or films,” for example, “detailing the performance of an
abortion [procedure]” according to Blackmun.171 Thus,
Blackmun explicitly recognized that information designed to
hinder a woman’s decision-making process is unconstitutional
even under the lesser protection afforded by the Casey joint
opinion and in the absence of any showing that the information
168.
169.
omitted).
170.
171.

See infra Part IV.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.

29

2014]

UPHOLDING A 40-YEAR-OLD PROMISE

157

acted as a complete prohibition on her ability to seek an
abortion.172
Second, Scalia’s dissent in Casey generally blasted the
undue burden standard as being inherently unworkable and
clearly not found in the constitution.173 He also argued that the
undue burden standard seems to stand for the proposition that
any regulation that works too well, in other words which
significantly reduces the number of abortions, must be an
undue burden.174 The example he gave to demonstrate this is if
a state required women to read a pamphlet detailing the facts
of fetal development and this reduced the number of abortions,
then this could be found to be an undue burden.175 However,
take another example of the same type of reasoning he
employed here. What if a state decided to fully fund pregnancy,
childbirth, and all childcare needed after birth including
daycare for women who are in difficult financial circumstances
and the state required all women be given this information
before having an abortion? This might significantly decrease
the abortion rates in that state so this too would be an undue
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 935.
Id. at 985 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 992.
Id. Justice Scalia stated,
If, for example, a State required a woman to read a
pamphlet describing, with illustrations, the facts of fetal
development before she could obtain an abortion, the effect
of such legislation might be to “deter” a “significant number
of women” from procuring abortions, thereby seemingly
allowing a district judge to invalidate it as an undue
burden. Thus, despite flowery rhetoric about the State's
“substantial” and “profound” interest in “potential human
life,” and criticism of Roe for undervaluing that interest, the
joint opinion permits the State to pursue that interest only
so long as it is not too successful. As Justice B[lackmun]
recognizes (with evident hope), the “undue burden”
standard may ultimately require the invalidation of each
provision upheld today if it can be shown, on a better record,
that the State is too effectively “express[ing] a preference for
childbirth over abortion.” Reason finds no refuge in this
jurisprudence of confusion.

Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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burden under Scalia’s reasoning. However, this is quite
obviously an incorrect interpretation of what the Court meant
by an undue burden.
Scalia’s mistake here is to suggest that any regulation that
successfully decreases abortion rates must be an undue burden.
The joint opinion in Casey, though, clearly was not arguing for
this position. This highlights the point above that attempts to
persuade women to choose childbirth, no matter how
successful, are not undue burdens. However, when these
attempts take the form of hindering women’s free choice by
interfering in the decision-making and reasoning process of the
woman, then an undue burden is found. This mistake made by
Scalia actually shows that the joint opinion in Casey obviously
understood the difference between regulations that worked to
change women’s minds legitimately and ones that worked to
change women’s minds in an unconstitutional way.
The above explanation of Casey shows that abortion
regulations requiring doctors to provide specific information to
women seeking an abortion are constitutional only if that
information: (1) is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant, and
(2) does not unduly interfere with a woman’s decision-making
process.176 The undue burden standard also can be used to
invalidate state provisions beyond these cases as well. The
undue burden standard created two “prongs” of analysis in
assessing state regulations: purpose and effect.
C. Constitutional Purpose and Effect of the Law
First, the undue burden test itself makes clear that the
purpose of “placing a substantial obstacle in the path of the
woman seeking an abortion” is not a permissible government
purpose.177 Proving that the legislature has acted with an

176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
177. Id. at 878. Following Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997),
some say this “prong” of the test has been written out, but Mazurek itself did
not hold this directly and does not overturn the plain wording of Casey here.
See Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed
“Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2566-67 (2006); see also Wharton, et al.,
supra note 29, at 346 (arguing Mazurek is not the death of the purpose
prong); Whitman, supra note 29, at 1982.
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impermissible purpose can be extremely difficult, however.
Further, since many have interpreted Casey to require that a
state only show that a regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose,178 it is relatively easy for
legislatures to be able to pass this test. Finally, even the notion
of a legitimate purpose has been expanded to include
questionable government purposes. Specifically, in Casey the
Court held that a state regulation with the purpose of
protecting women’s health or safety is permissible, but the
State cannot create unnecessary health regulations that do no
more than pose an undue burden in the name of women’s
health.179 After Gonzales, however, state regulations designed
to prevent women from having emotional problems after
abortions they come to regret are also seen to legitimately
serve this interest.180 Thus, Gonzales sanctioned states to
create regulations on abortion with the purpose of, in effect,
protecting women from themselves. This prong then appears to
be a rather weak mechanism for invalidating legislation.
The Casey joint opinion also analyzed whether a state
regulation has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion in a way that goes beyond
requiring the information provided to be truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant.181 The Court took up the issue of
whether a regulation has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in a woman’s path when it considered the various
provisions of the law under review in Casey.182 First, the threejustice opinion concluded that the twenty-four hour waiting
period and counseling provisions did not have the effect of
creating a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions.183
Although they accepted the findings of the District Court,
which concluded that the waiting period might increase the
178. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
179. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“[T]he State may enact regulations to
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the
right.”).
180. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007).
181. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78, 883.
182. Id. at 879-901.
183. Id. at 881-99.
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cost and create a risk of delay for abortions, the justices
concluded this was not enough to pose a substantial obstacle.184
They said, “[a] particular burden is not of necessity a
substantial obstacle.”185 In explaining what an undue burden is
and is not, the opinion here added, “[t]he fact that a law which
serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right
itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to
invalidate it.”186
However, in reviewing the requirement that a woman
must notify her spouse that she is having an abortion except in
certain proscribed circumstances prior to obtaining an
abortion, the opinion here declared this to have the effect of
being a substantial obstacle.187 The opinion focused on the
incidence of domestic violence in marriages and concluded that
due to the abuse and intimidation that sometimes occurs in
marriage, “[t]he spousal notification requirement is thus likely
to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an
abortion.”188 Importantly, the opinion did make clear here that
even on a facial challenge like this one, the Court should not be
looking at the impact on all women seeking abortions, nor even
all women who might have to notify their spouses about
abortion.189 Instead, when determining whether a regulation
has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle, the Court says,
“[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law
is irrelevant.”190 Using this standard then, the opinion defines
as the target class, “married women seeking abortions who do
not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who
do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions.”191 Looking at
this group, the Court concluded, “in a large fraction of cases in
which [the spousal notification provision] is relevant, it will

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 887.
Id.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895.
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operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to
undergo an abortion.”192 Thus, to determine whether a
regulation has the effect of creating a substantial obstacle for a
facial challenge after Casey, the Court must examine how it
affects the large fraction of relevant women who will be
affected by the regulation.193
The standards one should use to determine whether an
abortion regulation places a substantial obstacle in the path of
the woman have not been fully elucidated by the Court;
nonetheless, a few clear principles emerge.194 First, even if a
large number of women are slightly inconvenienced by a
certain state abortion regulation, this alone does not constitute
an undue burden.195 Second, even if a regulation operates in a
way that it creates a substantial obstacle for a large fraction of
only a small group of women, if those affected women are the
ones that are restricted by the regulation, then the regulation
does pose an undue burden.196 Third, if a state regulation has
the effect of deterring women from having abortions, then it
poses an undue burden.197 Fourth, if a state regulation only
slightly increases costs and adds inconveniences, then it does
not pose an undue burden.198 Finally, the Casey Court observed
that “at some point increased cost could become a substantial
obstacle.”199 This last point, although rather vague, certainly
suggests that a regulation which increases costs significantly

192. Id.
193. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188-89 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
194. See Borgmann, supra note 29, at 683.
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
196. Even for facial attacks of federal statutes, it appears the Casey
Court did not use the stricter test of constitutionality developed in United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and instead determined that facial
challenges of abortions statutes may succeed if a large fraction of relevant
women are affected. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; see also John Christopher Ford,
Note, The Casey Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on Abortion
Statutes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1445-46 (1997). The vast majority of federal
circuits have rejected application of the so-called “Salerno test” to facial
challenges of abortion regulations. See Wharton, et al., supra note 29, at 354
& n.206.
197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
198. Id. at 886.
199. Id. at 901.
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may also constitute an undue burden.200 Whether a substantial
obstacle exists in cases other than these remains open to
reasonable interpretation and will be discussed in more detail
below.
In sum, any regulation on abortion must first be rationally
related to a legitimate government interest including
protecting women’s health and protecting fetal life.201 Next, any
regulation that requires women to be given specific information
prior to abortion is permissible so long as the information is
truthful, non-misleading, relevant, and does not unduly hinder
a woman’s decision-making process.202 Finally, any such
regulation cannot have the effect of posing a substantial
obstacle for a large fraction of the relevant group of women
affected by the regulation in effectuating their choice.203 A
substantial obstacle exists, at least, where women are deterred
from having abortions by the regulation and where costs are
made significantly higher, but not where costs and
inconvenience are only slightly increased.204
IV. Why the Texas Sonogram Act fails Casey’s Test for
Constitutionality
To begin, we must first ask whether the purpose of the
Texas Sonogram Act is to serve a legitimate government
purpose or, in the alternative, to place a substantial obstacle in
the path of the woman seeking an abortion.205 Legal scholars
have explored whether the United States Supreme Court would

200. But see Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 466 F. Supp. 2d
934, 946 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that a $100 increase in the cost of
abortion, which equaled up to a 25% increase in the overall cost of the
procedure, did not constitute an undue burden on the right to obtain an
abortion), aff’d in part, rev'd in part, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006).
201. Again, Casey may be interpreted to require a higher standard than
this. See Tobin, supra note 25, at 125-26. But following Gonzales and other
interpretations, we will assume that this is the standard for the purposes of
this argument.
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
203. Id. at 895.
204. Id. at 886.
205. See supra Part III.B. (noting that abortion regulations that take
effect prior to viability are no longer subject to strict scrutiny).
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declare unconstitutional legislation regulating abortion that
has an illegitimate purpose, even in circumstances when such
legislation does not, in effect, create a substantial obstacle.206
The Texas Sonogram Act does not present a case in which the
purpose of the legislation is difficult to determine. To the
contrary, the caption of the Texas Sonogram Act reads,
“Voluntary and Informed Consent.”207 Proponents of this Act
would argue that requiring a woman to undergo a sonogram
and requiring her doctor to describe the images on the
sonogram simply gives women information germane to their
decisions. The sound of the heart auscultation and the sight of
the fetal sonogram image are pieces of information that some
women may indeed consider as part of the decision-making
process, and thus the Act could be deemed rationally related to
the legitimate government purpose of informed consent. We
will therefore examine the next set of questions under Casey:
(1) whether this information is relevant to the decision to have
an abortion; (2) whether it is truthful and non-misleading; (3)
whether it unduly hinders women’s decision-making process;
and (4) whether it poses a substantial obstacle to the right to
choose an abortion.208
A. Relevant to Her Decision
There are cases where information garnered by a
sonogram may be quite relevant to a woman’s decisions
regarding her pregnancy. For example, a sonogram could
reveal fetal abnormalities or ectopic pregnancies. In addition,
doctors may conclude for other reasons that a sonogram is
medically necessary prior to administering an abortion.209 The
Texas Sonogram Act, however, requires a woman to undergo a
206. See Wharton, et al., supra note 29, at 346 (“[L]ower courts have
misread Mazurek in precisely this manner, misconstruing it as the death of
the purpose prong.”) (footnote omitted); see also Amy E. Crawford, Comment,
Under Siege: Freedom of Choice and the Statutory Ban on Abortions on
Military Bases, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1549, 1566 & n.98 (2004).
207. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013).
208. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877, 882-84
(1992).
209. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 346; see also Vandewalker, supra
note 25, at 28.
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sonogram and hear the description of its image in every case,
regardless whether the sonogram is medically necessary.210 The
issue, therefore, is whether states may determine that
information proffered by a forced description of a sonogram is
relevant to a woman who has chosen to have an abortion even
in those cases in which the sonogram is not deemed medically
necessary.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Court examined the relevancy of the sonogram requirement in
2012. The Circuit Court stated,
[T]he provision of sonograms and the fetal
heartbeat are routine measures in pregnancy
medicine today. They are viewed as ‘medically
necessary’ for the mother and fetus. Only if one
assumes the conclusion of Appellees’ argument,
that pregnancy is a condition to be terminated,
can one assume that such information about the
fetus is medically irrelevant. The point of
informed consent laws is to allow the patient to
evaluate her condition and render her best
decision under difficult circumstances. Denying
her up to date medical information is more of an
abuse to her ability to decide than providing the
information.211
The extraordinary aspect of this statement is that the court of
appeals made this claim while reviewing a regulation that is
triggered only when a woman has presented herself for an
abortion.212 Thus, she has already decided that her pregnancy
is a condition to be terminated when she is forced to undergo a
sonogram. To describe the Texas sonogram requirement as
being about “routine measures in pregnancy medicine”213 is to
completely distort the situation for women to whom this

210. § 171.012.
211. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012).
212. See id. at 573.
213. Id. at 579.
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legislation applies. Further, although this statement by the
court of appeals suggests that a woman cannot truly decide to
have an abortion without first having access to the information
proffered by the sonogram, the court of appeals never makes
clear why this would be so.
Obviously the information garnered by a sonogram is not
necessary for a woman to understand the effect of an abortion
on a fetus; every competent woman seeking an abortion
understands that abortion results in the destruction of the
fetus. Perhaps the court of appeals is saying that states may
determine that a woman cannot truly understand what
abortion is without seeing or hearing a description of the fetus
in her uterus at that moment. Why this would be the case is,
again, never fully elucidated by the court. The court of appeals
does, however, rely on the Supreme Court’s determination in
Casey that, in the context of abortion, the concept of informed
consent is “broad enough to include the potential impact on the
fetus.”214 Understanding Casey’s determination of what is
relevant to a woman’s decision for abortion then is important to
determining whether the Act would fail the requirement of
relevance here.
The Casey Court concluded that the information doctors
were required to provide to women seeking abortions, including
the “probable gestational age of the unborn child,” could not be
said to be entirely irrelevant to the woman’s decision to
abort.215 The rationale to support this claim is rather
surprising and merits examination. The Supreme Court stated,
It cannot be questioned that psychological wellbeing is a facet of health. Nor can it be doubted
that most women considering an abortion would
deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to
ensure that a woman apprehend the full
consequences of her decision, the State furthers
the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a

214. Id. at 580 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 883 (1992)).
215. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
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woman may elect an abortion, only to discover
later,
with
devastating
psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed.216
This language suggests that the Supreme Court believed that
some women undergoing abortions might not understand the
consequences of an abortion for the fetus and will be
psychologically damaged when they later learn the truth.
However, this makes no sense if interpreted literally to mean
that women don’t know abortion ends in the destruction of the
fetus. Therefore, the Court must be relying on the notion that
knowing the age of the fetus somehow relates to understanding
what abortion is in another way.
The Court deciding Casey also suggested that
information regarding the gestational age of the fetus is
relevant to informed consent for the purpose of protecting the
health of the woman.217 This idea was relied on heavily in
Gonzales, as we saw, as a basis for removing a woman’s
decision regarding an abortion procedure altogether.218 It is
important to note, however, that the Court in Casey does not,
in fact, rely on the claim that information regarding the
consequences of abortion for the fetus is related to informed
consent by protecting women’s psychological well-being. The
Court seemed to recognize the possibility that this kind of
information may not, ultimately, truly be found to relate to
women’s health outcomes when they say that information
about consequences to the fetus when one is having an abortion
may be allowed “even when those consequences have no direct
relation to her health.”219
Nonetheless, the Court stated in Casey that information
relating to the impact of an abortion upon a fetus may be
relevant for other reasons.220 To support this view, the Court
relied upon the example of a person undergoing a kidney

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 881-82.
See supra Part III.C.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
Id. at 882-83
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transplant, stating that information regarding health risks to
the organ donor would be relevant to the transplant patient’s
decision to undergo the procedure.221 This analogy further
confuses the issue. Obviously a pregnant woman knows the
“risks” of abortion for the fetus; the sole purpose of an abortion
is to terminate the pregnancy. This analogy of the transplant
patient taking into consideration the risks that the organ donor
would be facing does not apply. Nonetheless, the Casey Court
concluded that all of the required information including the
information regarding the age of the fetus is relevant to a
woman’s decision to abort.222
Under the reasoning described above then, when applying
Casey’s holding to the Texas Sonogram Act, are sonogram
images (either described or viewed) relevant to a woman’s
decision to abort such that they may be required as an aspect of
informed consent? Requiring a woman to undergo a sonogram
and either hear or see the results of this intrusive procedure is
quite different from simply being told the approximate age of
the fetus. First, in Casey, women were being given information
about the approximate stage of fetal development of their
pregnancies and this information could not likely be accurately
obtained in another way.223 Other cases after Casey have held
that states can even go so far as to include color pictures of
fetal development at various stages to further women’s
understanding of fetal development.224 So precisely what
information does a sonogram image and the explanation
thereof provide that cannot be obtain by these less intrusive
means?
It may be true that a woman who requests such
information would find it relevant to her decision, but the
argument that no woman can make a truly informed decision
about abortion without seeing or hearing about the sonogram

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D. Ky. 2000);
see also Moredock, supra note 29, at 1989 (“Even though some of the fetal
development photographs included in the pamphlet [in Eubanks] were colorenhanced and others were enlarged, the court found the materials to be
‘truthful and not misleading.’”).
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image of her fetus is seriously problematic. As discussed
further below, a sonogram image is not an unqualified true
fact, but an image that fails to disclose the full reality of
pregnancy.225 Further, forcing women to have to view or hear
about their own “individual” fetus is an obvious attempt to
“personify the fetus.”226 If all the sonogram is meant to show is
the stage of fetal development of the pregnancy, this
information is already being provided in other ways. Thus, the
sonogram is redundant and provides no new relevant
information.
Finally, this line of argument that no woman can give
informed consent to an abortion without reviewing her
sonogram information suggests that all women who choose
abortion must not take the existence of the fetus seriously. It
suggests that women cannot on their own make the connection
between the fetus growing in their womb and the fact that it
exists, that it will grow and develop, and that it may even
become a newborn baby—their newborn baby. This claim
diminishes the dignity of women who are sometimes put in the
difficult position of choosing between a human organism
starting to grow within them and all of the other commitments
they already have, whether they be to children, jobs, schooling,
or something else. To accept that viewing a sonogram is
necessary for a woman to make an informed decision to abort is
to accept unquestioningly a stereotypical pro-life view about
women; that a woman would not choose to abort, but for the
fact that she either does not know what abortion truly is or
does not understand what she is truly doing when she has
one.227 Taking this line of reasoning one step further provides a
basis for states to ban abortions in order to protect women from
themselves.228
225. See infra Part IV.B.
226. Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much)
Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1341 (2009) (quoting
Requirements for Ultrasound, supra note 4, at 1).
227. See generally Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse
of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 65-67 (1997) (discussing the use
of fetal imagery by pro-life proponents in the abortion debate).
228. Some commentators have suggested that Gonzales has already set
us down this road by accepting the belief that women need to be protected
from their own decision to abort. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 118, at 1617
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B. Truthful and Non-misleading
Regarding the Texas Sonogram Act, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit declared that, “required disclosures of a
sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions
are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information.”229
Yet, even this seemingly non-controversial claim is arguable
when examined in more depth. To begin, theorists have
discussed the misleading nature of sonogram pictures in
general; especially ones that are taken later in pregnancy and
are often enhanced for the public eye.230 Sonograms produce
images that are created rather than captured.231 The images
popularly shown depict fetuses as small, baby-like entities,
floating freely through what appears to be empty space.232 In
fact, one description of the first widely-disseminated image of
the developing fetus described it as, “[t]he unfinished child
looking like an astronaut in its transparent bubble.”233 These
visual images create the false picture that the fetus is a fully
developed and independent entity, like a little baby trapped in
a hostile environment. The relationship of the fetus to the
pregnant woman disappears, and the role of the pregnant
woman in fetal development is glaringly absent. In effect, these
popularly disseminated sonogram images create an entity that
simply does not exist—a fetus that is physically independent
(“With Gonzales v. Carhart came a double bind: neither the traditional
disclosure standard nor a heightened one offered an adequate means of
protecting women's interests. Put differently, the Supreme Court has gone
from saying that the government may not require, as part of informed
consent, information that is designed to discourage the abortion choice, to
saying that the government may require such material so that women will
make ‘mature and informed’ decisions and will be protected from later regret,
to saying that the government may simply eliminate an abortion choice so
that women are protected both from the anxiety that adequate information
could provoke and from the regret that could come if later they were to learn
that information.”) (footnotes omitted).
229. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir. 2012).
230. See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual
Culture in the Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 280-83 (1987).
231. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the
Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 378-79 (2008).
232. Petchesky, supra note 230, at 270.
233. Sanger, supra note 231, at 355 (footnote omitted).
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from the pregnant woman. To present the fetus as a separate
entity is to obfuscate the reality of the pregnancy itself—the
dependence of the fetus upon the pregnant woman’s body.
Surely, this type of sonogram image can be said to be
misleading then in that the pregnant woman and her
experience of the pregnancy literally disappears from view.
No doubt proponents of the Texas Sonogram Act would try
to distinguish the sonogram image being described above from
the one that a pregnant woman is forced to hear about and
encouraged to see in Texas. Such proponents might argue that
the sonogram image does not show a “created” baby-like fetus,
but instead depicts the fetus as it exists at the moment when
the woman carrying that fetus is deciding whether to terminate
her pregnancy. Because most abortions are performed during
the early stages of pregnancy, the images captured by a
sonogram are not likely to be so compellingly baby-like and
may, in fact, appear to be more blob-like than baby-like.234
Regardless, the image of the fetus depicted by these sonograms
remains totally divorced from its true context: one of complete
embeddedness in the pregnant woman’s womb. In addition,
sonographers often contribute to the “creation” of the fetal
image in actual practice.235 What might appear to be a blob to
the uneducated eye can be transformed into a head or an arm
with the sonographer’s guidance.236 Some sonographers even
ascribe meaning to movements beyond what can possibly be
true, such as in descriptions of the fetus as “waving” or
“hiding.”237
The fact that this sonogram is of the pregnant woman’s
actual fetus may make it more misleading in some ways rather
than less. Not only does a sonogram perpetuate the false image
of the fetus as an independent entity, but it also invites a
significantly higher emotional response among women because
it personifies the fetus.238 As one commentator has said, “even a

234. Id. at 369, 382-83.
235. Id. at 368-70.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 369.
238. Devins, supra note 226, at 1341 (citing Requirements for
Ultrasound, supra note 4, at 1). Although this may be true, it is important to
emphasize that this does not suggest that women are more emotional than
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truthful message may be misleading when it inappropriately
takes advantage of emotional influence to bias an individual’s
decision away from the decision that would be made in a nonemotional, fully informed state.”239 All relevant information
regarding fetal development can be provided to pregnant
women by legal means free of emotional influence and bias.240
The Texas legislature, however, mandates a means that creates
and then preys upon the heightened emotional state of the
pregnant woman, thus misleading her.241
Perhaps most misunderstood and overlooked in this
discussion, however, is the meaning of the experience of a
woman forced by the State to have a sonogram. As one theorist
has noted:
Mandatory ultrasound laws require women to
participate physically in what has become a rite
of full-term pregnancy: the first ultrasound. It
now operates as an early step in prenatal care.
By virtue of having the screening at all, women
are scooped into the social category of pregnant
women, however brief they intend that status to
be.242
The fact that it is the intrusive use of her own body, by
capturing the sonogram image against her will, which
transforms her experience of the pregnancy itself without her
consent makes this violation even more egregious.243 This
socially-conditioned response to having an ultrasound, the
feeling that one has, even momentarily, been transformed into
men in general or that women need to be protected from their own emotional
vulnerability. This interpretation is problematic and must be overtly
renounced. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate:
More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 33-36 (2011).
239. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion:
Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83
WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008).
240. Id. at 30.
241. This problematic aspect of the required sonogram information is
further discussed below. See infra Part IV.C.
242. Sanger, supra note 231, at 382.
243. Id. at 360.
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a mother-to-be, robs women of the ability to make their own
choices, free of bias, regarding how to view their state of
pregnancy.244 Regardless whether this aspect of sonograms was
a motivating factor for proponents of the Texas Sonogram Act,
the requirement that all women seeking an abortion must first
undergo the often emotionally intense first rite of passage into
actual motherhood certainly can be misleading to women who
do not see themselves as mothers.
Therefore, not only is the image captured by the
ultrasound misleading, but the social context of ultrasounds
actually transforms pregnant women into would-be-mothers
against their will, even if only temporarily. This entire process,
as well as the images captured therein, does not appear to be
the “epitome of truthful, non-misleading information” but, in
fact, the exact opposite.245
C. An Undue Burden on Women’s Decision-making Liberty
Regardless of whether courts deem state-mandated
information provided to women seeking abortions to be
truthful, non-misleading, or relevant, courts may deem such
information unconstitutional if it unduly hinders a woman’s
decision-making process.246 Obviously, although these are
separate grounds for determining the constitutionality of an
abortion regulation, there is some overlap between the various
grounds. A showing that a regulation requires the delivery of
information that is untruthful, misleading or irrelevant may
also be part of showing that such regulation unduly hinders a
woman’s decision-making liberty.247 However, even information
that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant in a narrow
sense may pose an undue burden to women’s decision-making
liberty if it otherwise unduly hinders her ability to choose
freely.248 Thus, a court reviewing Texas’s sonogram law could
244. Id. at 360, 373.
245. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570, 578 (5th Cir. 2012).
246. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992).
247. Id. at 875-76.
248. Id. at 878.
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reject the claim that the information it requires is misleading,
but accept nonetheless the claim that the law violates women’s
decision-making liberty protected by Casey.
Precisely what type of interference with a woman’s
decision-making process constitutes an undue burden? The
Court has ruled that a mandate requiring the delivery of
untruthful, misleading, and/or irrelevant information hinders a
woman’s free choice, regardless whether such information
significantly affected any woman’s decision.249 So, the crucial
factor is not whether the required information actually
succeeds in interfering with a woman’s decision-making
process. Instead, the issue of an undue burden turns on the
nature of the interference itself and the method by which it
interferes with a woman’s decision. Information meant to
persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion is
constitutional.250 Information that manipulates, coerces, or
otherwise disrupts a woman’s reasoning process presents an
undue burden on her decisional liberty.251
To understand why this is so, we will examine the
philosophical underpinnings of the doctrine of informed
consent. Although the legal doctrine of informed consent may
not be fully illuminating regarding the Texas Sonogram Act,252
the philosophical examination of informed consent concepts
provide a rich theoretical framework to help assess Casey’s
concern regarding burdens that interfere with a woman’s free
choice. In this context, where we are dealing with statutes that
relate to medical decision-making, the examination of informed
consent from a philosophical perspective establishes clear
concepts regarding what renders a choice “free.” These concepts
help give content to the requirement that states may not create
an undue burden on a woman’s free choice in terms of
interferences with her reasoning process itself. Thus, the
following analysis of what information may be impermissible
for true informed consent is not relying on the legal doctrine of
informed consent to argue that states cannot legally require

249.
250.
251.
252.
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See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
Sawicki, supra note 238, at 5-6.
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certain impermissible information. Instead, the informed
consent doctrine, which specifies what is necessary for “free
choice,” is binding on states due to the constitutional
requirement laid down in Casey that states may not unduly
hinder a woman’s free choice.
In addition, the purported purpose of the Texas Sonogram
Act is to advance informed consent.253 Indeed, Casey explicitly
relates the informational requirements in that case to the
state’s asserted interest in “ensuring a decision that is mature
and informed” and “to ensure an informed choice.”254 It
therefore becomes necessary to examine both the legal and
philosophical doctrines of informed consent in order to
understand how far states may go in requiring information
before they may be said to violate a woman’s decisional liberty.
In the legal context, informed consent has its roots in the
common law rule that any unwanted touching, even for the
purpose of medical treatment, is a battery.255 Thus, only by
receiving the consent of a person seeking medical treatment
will a doctor have the right to treat him or her. This approach
emphasizes an “individual’s right to control what happens to
her body and to be protected from unwanted physical
intrusions.”256 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has relied on
this doctrine of consent prior to medical treatment as a
foundation for a patient’s constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause,257 demonstrating a
nexus between informed consent and individual liberty via the
Due Process Clause. Around the 1950’s, the legal and ethical
concept of mere consent gave way to a requirement of informed
consent.258 Consent is “informed” when the person in question
has the capacity to make decisions about his medical care, is
participating voluntarily in the decision-making, and has
information adequate and appropriate to such decision.259

253. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013).
254. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
255. See Manian, supra note 29, at 235-37.
256. See Dresser, supra note 118, at 1602-03 (citation omitted).
257. See Manian, supra note 29, at 237 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)).
258. See Gold & Nash, supra note 25, at 6.
259. See id. at 6-7 (citing 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
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Further, many statutes suggest that the necessary information
required for medical treatment must provide patients with “a
general understanding of the procedure, the medically
acceptable alternative procedures or treatments, and the
substantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed
treatment or procedures.”260 Informed consent statutes are
animated by concepts that are deeply entrenched within the
biomedical ethics scholarship. The paternalistic model of
medicine, where doctors are seen as the one empowered to
make decisions for the welfare of their patients, has been
slowly replaced by the idea that competent patients must be
the ones authorized to make their own decisions.261 Canterbury
v. Spence, one of the leading cases discussing informed consent,
recognized the underlying purpose of the informed consent
doctrine was to show respect for a patient’s decision-making
capacity.262 The recognition of the importance of this concept
within a doctor-patient relationship has been the basis for one
of the main bioethical principles—that of respect for
autonomy.263 The bioethical principle of respect for autonomy is
the idea that patients are “free to choose and act without
controlling constraints imposed by others.”264 Autonomy
requires that decision-making be “free from both controlling
interference by others and from certain limitations such as
inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice.”265
This principle is based upon the belief that “each mature
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT- PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 63 (1982) [hereinafter
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]).
260. See Tobin, supra note 25, at 112 (quoting FLA STAT. § 766.103(3)(a)
(2005)); see also Dresser, supra note 118, at 1602-04; Runels, supra note 152,
at 185-88.
261. See Manian, supra note 29, at 235.
262. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see
also Manian, supra note 29, at 238.
263. See Manian, supra note 29, at 240 n.112; Vandewalker, supra note
25, at 5.
264. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 8 (1986).
265. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 99 (6th ed. 2009). Autonomy is part of the basic standards
of important medical organizations including the AMA and ACOG. See Gold
& Nash, supra note 25, at 7; see also Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 67-69.
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individual has a right to make the basic choices that affect her
life prospects,”266 which brings to mind the Court’s
determination in Casey that abortion regulations should
“inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”267
The concept of autonomy in biomedical principles,
however, is not absolute. The principle of beneficence, the
promotion of the welfare of others, is another central value of
the doctor-patient relationship.268 These two principles may
conflict with one another in cases where, for example, a patient
chooses to forego a treatment necessary for her health. The
doctrine of informed consent, and the Supreme Court in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, however,
support the claim that, for competent individuals, when the
two principles conflict the right to autonomy trumps the
principle of beneficence.269 At other times, however, these two
principles do work hand-in-hand. In fact, the doctrine of
informed consent recognizes not only that the patient should be
the ultimate decision-maker regarding her fate, but also that
she may be the one in the best position to protect her own
interests, including health outcomes, when given the proper
information to decide.270
The doctrine of informed consent also contains a welldefined exception that allows for patients to opt out of receiving
certain information even when it is relevant to and necessary
for fully informed consent. The patient waiver exception, which
allows patients to refuse to receive certain pieces of
information, is widely recognized as valid.271 This exception is
patently consistent with the principle of autonomy. If a patient
chooses not to receive certain information, then the doctor

266. Manian, supra note 29, at 240.
267. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
268. See Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 34-35.
269. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
270. See President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med.
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Values Underlying Informed
Consent, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120-22 (David DeGrazia, Thomas A. Mappes,
& Jeffrey Brand Ballard eds., 7th ed. 2011).
271. See Manian, supra note 29, at 241 n.116; Vandewalker, supra note
25, at 67-68 (citing Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee on
Ethics Opinion No. 439, Informed Consent 1, 3 (2009)); see also Sawicki,
supra note 238, at 34-35.
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should respect that patient’s autonomy so long as the patient
understands the consequences of his refusal.272
An application of these principles of informed consent to
abortion regulations demonstrates that some disclosures could
violate the requirements of informed consent even if they are
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant. Take, for example, a
statute that requires all women who are contemplating a
second trimester but pre-viability abortion to view the fetal
remains after an abortion of a fetus near the same age as the
one they are carrying. Or, for a less controversial example,
imagine a statute that required all men planning to undergo
prostate surgery, a surgery that many patients often claim to
regret,273 to watch the surgery being performed live before they
could give their informed consent to the surgery. In each
example, the information delivered to the patient is truthful,
but the graphic nature of the information could violate respect
for autonomy by unduly influencing that person’s decision.274
How exactly does it do that, and what kind of graphic
information might have this effect?
One idea central to informed consent is that “[a] choice
that has been coerced, or that resulted from serious
manipulation of a person’s ability to make an intelligent and
informed decision, is not . . . the person’s own free choice.”275
The principle that people have the right to make their own
decisions about medical care free from coercion and
manipulation is part of the basic standards of many important

68.

272. See Manian, supra note 29, at 241; Vandewalker, supra note 25, at

273. See Manian, supra note 29, at 257 (discussing the results of a study
concluding that a number of men regret prostate surgery because they
experienced reduced sexual function afterwards).
274. Another independent ground for invalidating such statutes is the
First Amendment right of physicians. As the district court said regarding the
Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold the Texas Sonogram Act, “The concept that
the government may make puppets out of doctors, provided it does not step
on their patients’ rights, is not one this Court believes is consistent with the
Constitution, in the abortion context or otherwise.” Tex. Med. Providers
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14721, at *12-13
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). Thus, the First Amendment right of doctors also
needs to be addressed in conjunction with women’s due process arguments.
275. See Gold & Nash, supra note 25, at 7 (quoting MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS supra note 259, at 63).
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medical organizations including the American Medical
Association, and the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists.276
In Casey, the Court was concerned enough with
regulations designed to manipulate a woman’s choice that it
banned outright any state from requiring that misleading,
untruthful, or irrelevant information be provided to women
seeking an abortion.277 Some commentators have suggested
that regulations which manipulate women’s free choice violate
Casey as well.278 One theorist expressed his belief that:
[A] communication designed to influence a
woman’s decision whether to abort may be
considered an undue burden when it is
inappropriately manipulative (deliberately or
not) by inducing fear or anxiety, or when it
inappropriately affects her ability to decide,
leading to a decision that she would not have
made when not under the influence of such an
emotion.279
According to Reva Siegel, “[u]nder the undue burden
framework, dignity-respecting regulation of women’s decisions
can neither manipulate nor coerce women.”280
Biomedical ethicists have studied when information
manipulates choice so as to undermine informed consent by
interfering with a patient’s ability to fully understand his or
her options.281 This can occur by providing false or misleading
information,282 by “framing” decisions in such a way that a
choice or risk seems better or worse than it is,283 and by

276. See id.; Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 68.
277. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
278. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 239, at 31-32.
279. Id. at 31 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
280. See Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 76, at
1753.
281. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 264, at 365-66; see also
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 265, at 130, 134.
282. See Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 13-20.
283. Id. at 38 (citing FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 264, at 320-21;
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engaging in “psychological manipulation.”284 Psychological
manipulation, which is the use of information to unduly
influence a person’s decision, involves “appeals to emotional
weaknesses, and the inducing of guilt or feelings of
obligation.”285 This form of manipulation may not affect the
patient’s understanding, but may nonetheless interfere with
free choice by creating a heightened emotional state in the
patient and then requiring the patient to decide while in such
emotional state.286 This is exactly what the Texas Sonogram
Act does.287
The Texas Sonogram Act’s requirements that medical
providers display a sonogram image of the fetus and present
the fetal heartbeat to a woman seeking an abortion constitutes
the provision of graphic information that manipulates a
woman’s choice by appealing directly to her emotions.288 For
those women who would choose to have the sonogram and/or
hear the heartbeat, regardless whether it is mandated by the
State, that information could be relevant to their decision and
thus not manipulative of their choice. But, for all those women
who would refuse a non-medically necessary sonogram and/or
choose not to hear the results, requiring them to undergo such
procedures against their will is an obvious attempt to
manipulate their emotions in such a way as to influence their
choice.289 It is simply an undue burden on a woman’s “free
choice” when considering abortion.
Proponents of the Texas Sonogram Act might argue that
its purpose merely is to persuade a woman to decide against an
abortion rather than to manipulate her decision.290 As
discussed earlier, however, the sonogram itself and the
description of the fetus both personify the fetus and transform
the pregnant woman into a would-be mother.291 Such

BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 265, at 130, 134).
284. See id. at 39.
285. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 264, at 366.
286. See Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 42-44.
287. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2013).
288. Id. § 171.012(a)(4).
289. Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 43-44.
290. Id. at 29-30.
291. See supra Part IV.A.
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information does not appeal to the process of reasoning in order
to persuade; it appeals to her emotions in order to manipulate.
It is true that not all emotional influences affecting a person’s
decision are unduly manipulative, since people make decisions
based on their own emotional experiences.292 Nonetheless,
requiring the provision of information that attempts to
encourage a certain decision by completely circumventing
reasoned deliberation and instead inducing a certain emotional
response is quite a different matter. This is where persuasion
ends and manipulation begins in the context of decisionmaking and informed consent.
It is important to note that such manipulation creates a
constitutionally-defined undue burden even if it does not
actually affect the outcome of a woman’s decision.293 Although
people making a decision during a heightened emotional state
may make choices they otherwise would not,294 some emotional
manipulation does not have the desired effect. Accordingly,
some women continue to choose abortion.295 Nonetheless, just
as the Court in Casey declared that untruthful, misleading
and/or irrelevant information acts as an undue burden on a

292. See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 238, at 33.
293. Cf. Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 44 (“If this emotional reaction
were actually impossible for the patient to resist as she attempts to decide, it
would cause her to fail the condition of noncontrol necessary for autonomous
action. This is because an individual who acts in accord with an emotion that
is irresistible does not make a choice at all. Unlike being rationally persuaded
of prudential or moral considerations, an irresistible emotion unavoidably
compels an action and prevents the exercise of autonomy.”). We argue above
that attempted manipulation is all that is needed to pose an undue burden
and this extra finding—that the emotional reaction is irresistible—is not
necessary to prove the unconstitutionality of potentially manipulative
information, even if it is necessary to show that the information actually did
manipulate an individual’s decision in any particular case. See supra Part
IV.C.
294. See Blumenthal, supra note 239, at 4-5, 25-26 (discussing how
truthful and non-misleading information that preys on the emotional
vulnerabilities of a woman seeking an abortion can limit her autonomy);
Sanger, supra note 231, at 396-97 (describing the sonogram requirement as
an attempt to overpower reason rather than appeal to it); Sawicki, supra note
238, at 16-17.
295. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 351-52 (citing studies in British
Columba and Alabama determining that women who chose to view a
sonogram prior to abortion thereafter decided not to abort their fetus in a few
cases); Vandewalker, supra note 25, at 30 & n.149.
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woman’s right to choose by unduly interfering with the
decision-making process itself regardless of any showing that
the information actually affected a woman’s eventual decision,
so information that manipulates a woman’s decision is an
undue burden regardless of outcome.296
D. Other Substantial Obstacles Posed by the Texas Sonogram
Act
Other aspects of the Texas Sonogram Act constitute a
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions in
Texas. In Casey, the Court recognized that “[t]he proper focus
of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”297
Here, the relevant group is the women who would not
otherwise have chosen to have this procedure or hear this
information. The question, therefore, is whether the Texas
Sonogram Act places a substantial obstacle in the path of a
large fraction of that relevant group of women. One important
aspect of this law, as it is written, is that it may require
transvaginal ultrasounds to be performed in a large proportion
of cases.298 Although some commentators have argued that
ultrasounds are non-invasive procedures,299 this is not the case
when performed transvaginally. This procedure is not only
invasive, but it is invasive in a way that can only be described
as demeaning. To force a woman to remain still while a probe is
inserted into her vagina against her will is to require a
procedure that is tantamount to rape. If forcing women to
submit to forced vaginal probes against their will is not a
substantial obstacle, it is quite difficult to imagine anything
short of an absolute bar to choice qualifying as a substantial
obstacle. Yet, Casey clearly did not set so high a bar.300 To

296. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 352 (“[G]oing ahead with the
abortion [after viewing a sonogram] shows that the requirement did not
constitute an obstacle, but it does not show that the woman was not burdened
by it.”).
297. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992).
298. See supra Part I; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Roseberry, supra note 30, at 399.
300. See supra Part II.B.
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require a woman to undergo such a personal violation in the
absence of any clear medical benefit301 places a substantial
obstacle in her path of choice.
Many commentators have described the other aspects of
this law that place a substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking abortions in Texas. Since these arguments have been
made convincingly and extensively elsewhere, the main points
are only briefly summarized below.
First, the Texas Sonogram Act denies women their
constitutionally protected right to refuse treatment for reasons
that fit none of the usual circumscribed exceptions.302 Is an
obstacle that requires women to waive one of their basic
constitutional rights before they may have an abortion an
undue burden then? It certainly seems reasonable to conclude
that this could be so interpreted by the Court.
Second, by requiring all women to have an ultrasound, the
Texas Sonogram Act is likely to increase the costs associated
with having abortions. As one analysis of Oklahoma’s abortion
law examined, requiring an ultrasound in that state could
increase costs of abortion “between forty-seven percent and
seventy percent.”303 Such cost increase, if similarly exhibited in
Texas, may constitute an undue burden under Casey.
Third, some commentators believe that laws like this one
could pose a substantial obstacle by creating psychological
burdens for women forced to receive a sonogram and hear the
information detailed therein against their will.304 The
psychological burden could be created in either one of two
ways. First, a woman forced to undergo a sonogram and hear it
described may not change her mind regarding her decision to
have an abortion, but she may experience more grief or
psychological trauma as a result of that experience.305 Second,
a woman who, in the midst of this heightened emotional state,
chooses not to have an abortion and instead gives birth to a
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See supra Part IV.A.
See Weber, supra note 30, at 368, 381.
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See Roseberry, supra note 30, at 399-400; Weber, supra note 30, at

305. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 352 (describing anecdotal evidence
of potential emotional upset).
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child for whom she is not in a good position to care also may
also experience psychological trauma.306 The question is
whether this kind of psychological trauma would rise to the
level of creating a substantial obstacle in a large fraction of
cases where women chose not to have or see the sonogram but
were forced to anyway. Analyzing this type of argument would
require empirical research, which may help to assess further
the true psychological burdens that laws like this may cause
women seeking abortions.
V. Conclusion
There is much at stake when the Supreme Court next
addresses abortion regulations. Casey’s constitutional
requirements have been significantly misread by many.
Although the joint opinion in Casey did recognize that
protecting fetal life may be a permissible state interest, the
protection of potential life cannot be achieved through violation
of a woman’s right to make an informed decision. Thus, the
joint opinion in Casey clearly set the requirement that no
regulation prior to viability may unduly interfere with a
woman’s decision-making process. The Justices who comprised
the majority in Gonzales missed this crucial element of Casey
and therefore failed to protect women’s full constitutional
rights.
This Article has implications for many state abortion
regulations in addition to the Texas Sonogram Act. The
arguments herein may be used to show that any state law that
forces women to have medically unnecessary sonograms prior
to abortion is unconstitutional regardless of whether such law
requires that medical practitioners describe the images to the
patient. In addition, this Article provides ammunition to those
seeking to invalidate state regulations that require the delivery
of inaccurate information to women seeking abortion. Lastly,
and more generally, this Article shows why it is

306. See Weber, supra note 30, at 369-71, 382 (discussing the argument
that women being manipulated to carry to term may have psychological
trauma). This psychological trauma challenges proponents’ claims that such
abortion regulations serve the purpose of protecting women’s health.
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unconstitutional to allow any kind of state regulation of
abortion that purports to protect women from themselves in
terms of their decision-making processes.
The joint opinion in Casey acknowledged that women are
equal citizens entitled to the same liberties of thought, choice,
and action as other members of society. It also protected
women’s rights to make reproductive decisions by declaring
unconstitutional not only those state regulations that have the
purpose or effect of barring women from choosing an abortion
but also those regulations that manipulate women’s decisionmaking processes, even if manipulation is justified as being in
a woman’s best interest. Forty years after Roe first declared
abortion to be a fundamental right, courts must uphold that
promise and recognize that women’s liberty requires the right
to make an informed choice, free from regulations that treat
women as less than full persons under law.
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